This paper introduces and discusses an idea which minimizes gaming or manipulation activities, if payments are linked to results from manipulative methods. The idea is to add nonmanipulable information to manipulable information to improve the evaluation of a given output. A score declining in increasing evaluation quality indicates gaming and allows to estimate the true result. A simple linear incentive scheme is introduced in which a high evaluation score is rewarded. The introduced mechanism dominates any single evaluation method. However, limited liability restricts its applicability. If agents are risk-averse, the principal should let each agent decide, which evaluation method he prefers. Abstract This paper introduces and discusses an idea which minimizes gaming or manipulation activities, if payments are linked to results from manipulative methods. The idea is to add nonmanipulable information to manipulable information to improve the evaluation of a given output. A score declining in increasing evaluation quality indicates gaming and allows to estimate the true result. A simple linear incentive scheme is introduced in which a high evaluation score is rewarded. The introduced mechanism dominates any single evaluation method. However, limited liability restricts its applicability. If agents are risk-averse, the principal should let each agent decide, which evaluation method he prefers.
Introduction
The performance of organizations and employees is difficult to measure in many respects. The output is not immediately observable and it is difficult to quantify. The specific impact of an agent's effort is hard to identify. Hence, instruments of performance measurement use observable and inherently superficial characteristics. From these characteristics an evaluator can conclude on the real output (e.g. in academics, publication records often serve as a proxy for research quality). The application of superficial characteristics creates problems if principals link payments to performance. Agents have an interest in creating the observable characteristics. Such measures may incidentally improve desired output but they channel inputs in wasteful, window-dressing activities. Any principal get what he pays for, which is not necessarily what he wants (Kerr, 1975) .
To address this problem, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) propose subjective performance measures while Murphy and Oyer (2003) call for discretion in incentive contracts. However, these instruments may not be feasible in many organizations, e.g. in the public sector, where evaluation and payments should be as transparent as possible to restrict corruption. Courty and Marschke (CM; 2003) recommend to take the dynamic characteristics of gaming into account, as agents learn the mechanisms of the incentive contract much more precisely than the principal can anticipate. Hence, gaming increases over time and requires a change in the performance measurement. Their paper also includes a very helpful review of the literature.
In this paper, I propose another mechanism to minimize the wasteful activities if payment is linked to a more or less superficial evaluation method. Like in CM agents can game the results but in this paper gaming affects all evaluation methods. Then the idea is to increase evaluation quality by considering more information for the performance measurement. Hence, an evaluation instrument with high quality is an instrument which includes the most information into its analysis.
It is costly to acquire information, of course. The principal looks at the relationship between quality and evaluation score and uses this relationship to calculate a score, which reveals the impact of undesired activities. Therefore, he uses the worse tests as information for manipulative behaviour.
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To deter gaming completely, it is crucial that some manipulation cannot be manipulated. However, the proposed process allows better determent of manipulation than any single evaluation method, even if specific information is subject to specific manipulation.
The proposed mechanism and the underlying principal-agent model are in many aspects similar to the proposed weighting of multiple performance measures in Datar, Kulp and Lambert (DKL; 2001) . Indeed, this paper provides a simplification of DKL to take account of notable differences.
DKL and many other in the literature (e.g. Baker 2002 ) claim that incentive-compatible performance measurement implies a trade-off between risk and accuracy. However, the risk declines if a sufficient amount of relevant information is available at little cost. Adding information to a performance measure allows to identify the statistical relationship between information availability and measured performance. Think of added information as the next hour or day, and the tools from time-series econometrics can be applied to forecast the performance measure if another unit of information is added. This stepwise increase in the considered information also implies that more sophisticated evaluation methods are less risky, as more available information typically means a more precise estimation. As an additional difference to DKL, the model considers relationship of a principal with many agents with heterogeneous and unobservable abilities, which allows for self-selection processes among agents.
Though the mechanism and the underlying incentive contract are not dynamically modelled and the assumptions on the impact of gaming on different evaluation methods have been changed, the paper captures and enriches the results from CM. They show that an observable and manipulable output increases if it is included into an incentive contract, although the measure initially had a high correlation with the principal's objective. CM propose a lower incentive weight with increasing gaming and the introduction of a new measure if it implies lower impact of gaming. This paper proposes to keep a manipulable evaluation measure as an indicator for the extent of manipulation in a less manipulable evaluation measure.
Rewarding research quality may serve as an example. Research evaluators in Germany often use the number of publications as a proxy for quality, which is a cheap assessment method but dubious in terms of incentive compatibility (see Ursprung, 2003) . Scientists are induced to publish countless papers with little if any new results if payments depend on such evaluations. Yet more 3 papers are ceteris paribus better than less. Further measures such as citation impact, or the prestige of the journal could also be taken into account, for the price of higher evaluation costs.
Manipulating these measures is difficult for most scientists. The proposed evaluation record would immediately reveal the excessive output of meaningless papers, as the evaluation score declines sharply with the additional measures.
The analysis in this paper is based on a simple incentive mechanism. The objective is to develop an evaluation mechanism which reduces waste and inefficiency from a particular form of assymetric information. This focus sets the paper apart from other literature on incentives in sectors like education, which look on non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2004) , multi-tasking aspects (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) or career concerns (e.g. Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 2003) . The argument in this paper takes into account that agents might have constraints which inhibit the implementation of the proposed evaluation mechanism. The paper analyses limited liability and risk-aversion in greater detail. Here, Kräkel (2004) provides a useful contribution to incentive schemes for agents with limited liability The paper is structured as followed. The evaluation process and the proposed evaulation mechanism are introduced in the following section. Section 3 analyses the agency problem, at first in a benchmark case without manipulation and then in a case with manipulative evaluation results. Section 4 accounts for limited liability and section 5 for risk aversion. Section 6 tests the sensitivity of the results with respect to a change in the underlying assumptions.
The evaluation process
Evaluation constitutes an examination of the output of the agents in a specified period. Consider two methods, a good method T g and a bad method T b . The score of the good method reacts less sensitive to manipulation. The costs for this method are higher as well (K g > K b ), the costs for a perfect evaluation are prohibitively high. More general, costs increase in quality. Both methods use the same score scale.
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The time structure is the following. The principal chooses the evaluation mechanism and a wage contract. Then, the agents produce some output for one period. After the production, the output is evaluated and the payments are made. The principal evaluates honestly.
The principal can choose either method T g , or method T b , or a combination of both methods (T c , with costs K c ≥ K g ). For simplicity, the evaluation score of agent i evaluated with method T is the sum of two linear functions and a method-specific error term.
The two included functions are a desired-effort or "true output production" function
and an undesired-effort, manipulation or "superficial output" function
The evaluation depends on characteristics of the agent and the properties of the evaluation method.
The agent's ability in producing the desired output (e.g. his research ability) is denoted with θ i and e i is the desired effort (real input in research). Agents have also an ability to manipulate (µ i ) and can choose some undesired manipulation effort s i . Manipulation thus constitutes an investment in superficial output, i.e. window-dressing activities. Both abilities θ and µ are distributed between 0 and 1 according to identical independent normal distributions, with cov(θ, µ) = 0 and the density function g(θ) = g(µ). The individual abilities are private knowledge, their distributions are common knowledge. To get explicit solutions, the cost functions of the effort inputs are specified as
Section 6 discusses the impact of interdependencies between both cost functions. 
Hence, T g is a more sophisticated version of T b . Both test-scores are subject to manipulation.
The evaluation method has a two-fold impact on the observed quality. The better method T g is less prone to superficial output than method T b (i.e. γ g < γ b , with γ = 0 for a perfect test). The measurement error is subject to some evaluation-specific and student-specific observation error ε i,T . Furthermore, the realisations of ε i,T are identically and independently distributed across students as well as across evaluation methods.
The respective cumulative distribution function is denoted with F (ε i,T ) and the density function with f (ε i,T ). The iid assumption may not be the most realistic, but allows a simpler analysis of the second moment effects without loss of generality for the results.
The combined evaluation process
The principal and the agents know 0 < γ g < γ b , i.e. to what extend each test is prone to manipulation. The principal calculates the combined evaluation score with the help of the function
The principal uses this function because it provides a consistent estimation of the "true" or desired output.
Result 1
The expected desired output (E i ) is equal to the expected value of the combined evaluation.
Proof. Notice that
This equation can be transformed into
which implies
As manipulation affects all information in B identically, the principal does not even have to include all information from T b in T g to deter gaming in T c . He can run leaner estimations. This would hold even if information units in G B could be manipulated specifically, but only by pushing the measure upwards. Scholastic achievement tests provides an example for this caveat.
Test specific manipulation will become detrimental if the test score is seen as a comparatively manipulative evaluation instrument and remains outside T g , but inside T b . Then schools could induce their tested students to score poorly in the test, which would lead to a high combined evaluation score.
The expected value of the combined error term ε c is given by
Hence, the properties of ε ic are as follows:
Result 2 (i) Given that only two imperfect single evaluation methods exist, the variance of the combined error term is always larger as the variance of the best single evaluation method
(ii) The variance of the combined evaluation converges to infinity if the available evaluation methods are almost equal with respect to quality
and/or if both available evaluation methods are very bad.
Proof. The variance of method
and
Result 1 states that, on average, the combined evaluation reveals manipulation. This revelation is caused by the negative weight for the less sophisticated test score. Result 2 shows that any principal applying the mechanism may face a trade-off between evaluation quality and risk if the possibility to improve a test are small i.e. γ g= γ b . However, the risk of the combined evaluation can be lower than the risk of method T b if an evaluation method can be substantially improved and To begin with, suppose that evaluation results cannot be manipulated by the agent (i.e. γ T = 0, for T g and T b ). Agent i invests in effort, produces an output and gets a wage w, with
The wage is composed of a fixed payment α and a variable pay factor β. The agent's utility function is
with the respective first order condition:
This first order condition (19) allows to derive the incentive compatibility constraint in the principal-agent-model
The expression e * i denotes the effort level which is optimal for the agent. The principal wants to maximize his expected surplus. He achieves this objective by setting the wage components α and β as well as choosing the appropriate evaluation method. The principal can choose T g , T b , or their combination, T c . Hence, his problem is
For simplicity it is assumed that the total surplus accrues to the agents. Hence
constitutes the participation constraint of the principal. Inserting from (22) into (21) yields
Using the incentive compatibility constraint derived from (19) the principal can set optimal incentives for the desired effort:
Hence, the variable payment factor is identical for all agents whatever their ability is.
The fixed payment can be calculated with help of the principal's participation constraint (22):
Since the incentive mechanism is efficient the principal will always the evaluation method with the lowest cost. 
The case with manipulation of results
Now suppose γ T > 0 for T ∈ {T g , T b } . Agent i invests in effort and manipulation to maximize their utility. Hence, the agent's objective function is given by max e,s
with
and the respective first order conditions:
The first-order-conditions (29) and (30) allow to calculate the incentive compatibility constraints in the principal-agent-model, with e * * i and s * * i denoting the optimal effort and manipulation levels of the agent:
The ratio of both inputs depend on the respective abilities of the agent and the evaluation quality.
A change in the incentive factor β causes proportional changes of both inputs. Only a change in the evaluation quality changes the relative effort supply via γ T . Furthermore, equation (30) reveals that perfect evaluation makes manipulation efforts prohibitively costly for the agent.
Result 3 If the agents can manipulate the results, incentives are lower than in the case of no manipulation. The second-best outcome is a one-size-fits-all contract, i.e. every agent gets the same contract.
Proof. Now, the principal's profit function is given by
Again, the principal can choose the evaluation method among T g , T b and T c . He has to take the incentive compatibility constraints of his agents into account. The zero-profit condition for the principal is still holding (see (22)), which implies the following optimization problem
with the respective first order condition for β and T :
The optimal incentive weight is given by β * , the optimal evaluation quality by T * . The first order conditions imply
and an evalution quality where marginal costs and marginal benefits of evaluation quality are equal. Since perfect evaluation is prohibitively expensive, the evaluation cost function is convex, The fixed payment α is not necessarily negative anymore:
Note that E (Q i,T (θ, µ)) is identical for all agents, as the principal has no ex-ante information about the characteristics of an individual agent.
In summary, the principal sets lower incentives with increasing manipulability of the evaluation methods, otherwise the budget constraint will be violated. Hence, the principal will choose the combined evaluation method to eliminate manipulation if its costs are sufficiently low.
Limited Liability of the agents
In many cases, agents cannot bear losses indefinitely but require a minimum income. In this paper limited liability of the agents implies w ≥ 0. No agent can afford a negative income. Limited liability restricts the ability of the principal to apply the combined evaluation.
Result 4 With limited liability the incentives of the combined evaluation mechanism are weaker than in the case without. Suppose the costs of evaluation method b are zero, such that
Then exists always an extrapolation function that ensures that the combined evaluation dominates evaluation method g.
Proof.
The fixed income in the benchmark case is negative in order to cover the costs of the evaluation (see (26)). The principal has to reduce the variable payment in order to increase the fixed payment (as in (39)), which will reduce the incentives. Furthermore, the result of a combined 14 evaluation can be negative, too (see (7)). Hence, the principal has to restrict the possible results of the combined evaluation, which invites for manipulation (see Result 1). Previously, the principal used following function for the calculation of the combined quality score:
He has to change the function such that the second summand is smaller than the first one, e.g. by adding the following rule:
In this case the relation Q i,c < Q i,g holds if the score from method b is better than the one from method g. As the results from method b are more distorted by manipulation, Q i,c is closer to the desired output and less wasteful.
The first part of the result shows that limited liability restricts the possibility to eliminate manipulative inputs and induce desired effort. However, part two states that the combined evaluation is the most appropriate method if the principal modifies the extrapolation function (7). If combined evaluation becomes too costly, then the better single evaluation method dominates, of course.
Risk-aversion of the agents
The incentive effects of the combined evaluation changes again, if agents are risk-averse. The utility function remains as above max e,s,γ T
However, the wage includes a compensation for the risk of the evaluation, the risk premium
This premium is a function of the size of the risky component of the payment, indicated by β.
The component is risky because it depends on the evaluation score, which is associated with some uncertainty (ε T ). The degree of risk-aversion is given by r. It is assumed to be homogeneous among the agents. The risk premium increases in all arguments.
The participation and incentive compatibility constraints (22), (29) and (30) still hold.
Result 5 Given a sufficiently high degree of risk-aversion among agents, combined evaluation will be dominated by the best single method (T g ).
Proof. See appendix.
Unlike in the case of limited liability, risk-aversion not only modifies the application of combined evaluation method. Risk-aversion can actually inhibit it, because the combined evaluation method is associated with high risk. This high risk decreases the size of the variable payment (β).
Improving evaluation quality allows to decrease the risk of the combined evaluation. Yet, this does not necessarily make it the dominant solution, as the best single evaluation method improves as well. Adding more information decreases the risk of the combined evaluation more than the risk of applying only the best single, but manipulation is also better identified. However the principal can improve the situation by allowing for self-selection.
Result 6 Let agents choose between the combined evaluation method T c or the best single evaluation method T g and let the principal set optimal incentive parameters for each method. Then 1. an agent with a high θ and a low µ will choose T c ;
2. an agent with a low θ and a high µ will choose T g ; 3. an agent will choose T c if he was indifferent between T g and T c when evaluation methods were assigned by the principal;
4. the choice of evaluation methods by the agents dominates the assignment by the principal.
Proof. First recall that the risk of an evaluation is constant for all agents regardless of their specific abilities. Then, the first two results derive from (27) and the resulting relationship between expected income and associated risk. For the third result, note that the agent was indifferent when all agents where evaluated in the same way. Due to the self-selection, the rewards of the best single method T g decline, as all agents with a high productivity and little manipulation ability choose against it and the principal cannot differentiate between agents who game a lot and those who do less (see Result 1). Self selection dominates as incentives increase with productivity.
With sufficiently risk-averse agents, the principal can take into account that people with different characteristics have a different perspective on a given risk. The "good" and "honest" agents have less to fear from the combined evaluation and will choose it eventually. The "average" agents will join them, because otherwise they will be lumped together with the not so good and honest agents. Because the principal cannot distinguish these agents, the "average" agents would end-up cross-subsidizing those "less desirable" fellows.
Variation of the model
In this section some of the underlying assumptions are relaxed to investigate how the results change with a modification of these assumptions.
Individual contracts
Evaluating the agents over time allows the principal to identify the abilities of the agents. Hence, he is able to design specific contracts for each agent. This does not modify the contract design when agents are risk neutral and the combined evaluation is applied. However, it affects the value of applying the most suitable single evaluation method.
Result 7 The principal proposes individual contracts for each agent if he knows his abilities. With individual contracts, the combined evaluation becomes less attractive for agents with a high θ.
Proof. For the contract design, see appendix.
Under a one-size-fits-all contract, the more able and less manipulating agents subsidized their counterparts. This transfer payment is eliminated with individual contracts, which in turn makes the best single method more attractive for the more able and less manipulating agents.
As a consequence from this result, the combined evaluation mechanism is more attractive, if the characteristics of the agents are unknown, because more productive agents are more discouraged with one-size-fits-all contracts than with individual contracts.
Interdependence between the cost functions
Previously, the costs of the different inputs were independent. However, marginal costs for one input may depend on the provision of the other input. Let C 1 (e i , s i ) substitute C(e i ) and replace
Four relationships between the cost functions are possible 1.
Only the first of these effects changes the case for the application of the combined evaluation mechanism qualitatively. If manipulation would increase costs for the desired input (case 2), it would strengthen the case for the combined mechanism. The third case ( ∂C 2 ∂ei < 0) also increases the necessity to go again window-dressing. If the last case would hold, the entire discussion about gaming and manipulation would be obsolete.
Therefore, the focus is on the impact of Any of these projects may carry the big idea, so the pursuit of many projects may reduce the search costs for finding that good idea.
For any realistic consideration,
∂si∂ei > 0 and
> 0 have to hold, otherwise the desired effort could be increased without limits.
Result 8 Suppose ∂C 1 ∂si < 0 and
hold. Assume that agents are risk-neutral. Then, 1. the combined evaluation mechanism does not deter agents from showing some manipulative effort, 2. the evaluation quality from the best available single method is lower than in the case of ∂C 1 ∂si = 0 and 3. the utility derived from this best available single method is greater than in the case of
Proof. See appendix Agents will always game, even with the combined evaluation process being applied, because gaming facilitates the production of the desired output. Principals have a lower desire to deter agents from gaming, since it has some positive side effects.
Conclusions
The paper has introduced an evaluation mechanism which eliminates incentives for manipulation even if individual methods cannot perfectly detect manipulation. The mechanism was based on the extrapolation of the perfect evaluation score from the scores of imperfect evaluations. Given full information about test quality and ability distributions, the "true" evaluation score can consistently be estimated. The implications of the argument are straight-forward. If there are several evaluation scores attached to a given output, it is not the best idea to take the arithmetic mean of all scores. The quality of the evaluation methods has to be considered, too. A declining score at increasing evaluation quality indicates that there is more window-dressing than real substance.
Research evaluation is an area for a possible application. Here, methods with differing degrees of sophistication lead to different results for a given output and simple methods are easily manipulated.
The proposed mechanism sets better incentives than the application of any single evaluation mechanism if agents are not too risk-averse. If the liability of the agents is limited, combined evaluation may not completely deter from manipulation. If agents are risk-averse the selection of the evaluation method by each agent dominates uniform assignment by the principal. In this situation, the principal can improve his situation by allowing each agent to choose between an individual evaluation method and the combined mechanism.
The evaluation of research quality offered an example for application. Since the proposed mechanism is associated with a relatively large risk, it is more suitable for the evaluation of research organizations than individual scientists. straints imply
Given his participation constraint,the principal solves the following problem: max e,s,T
The first order conditions are
γ T µ i − C 2 − ∂C 1 (e * * * i , s * * * i ) ∂s i = 0 (53)
The second of these conditions implies s * * * i > 0 even for γ T = 0. (1. statement).
Integrating conditions 53 and 54 yields
The term ∂C1(e * * * i ,s * * * i ) ∂γ T µi reflects an additional marginal cost from increasing the evaluation quality. Hence, the quality of the best available single method is lower than in the previous sections (Statement 2).
The benefit of this best single method is higher because with 
